We reinvestigate the oblivious RAM concept introduced by Goldreich and Ostrovsky, which enables a client, that can store locally only a constant amount of data, to store remotely n data items, and access them while hiding the identities of the items which are being accessed. Oblivious RAM is often cited as a powerful tool, which can be used, for example, for search on encrypted data or for preventing cache attacks. However, oblivious RAM it is also commonly considered to be impractical due to its overhead, which is asymptotically efficient but is quite high: each data request is replaced by O(log 4 n) requests, or by O(log 3 n) requests where the constant in the "O" notation is a few thousands. In addition, O(n log n) external memory is required in order to store the n data items. We redesign the oblivious RAM protocol using modern tools, namely Cuckoo hashing and a new oblivious sorting algorithm. The resulting protocol uses only O(n) external memory, and replaces each data request by only O(log 2 n) requests (with a small constant). This analysis is validated by experiments that we ran.
Introduction
The need to enhance the security of data storage systems and to encrypt the content they store is obvious. Various encryption algorithms are in common use for many years, so content-encryption may be considered, for the most part, as an already-solved issue. Apparently, encryption alone does not suffice. A server, which maintains a data storage system, can gain information about its users' habits and interests, and violate their privacy, even without being able to decrypt the data that they store. The server can monitor the queries made by the clients and perform different traffic analysis tasks. It can learn the usual pattern of accessing the encrypted data, and try to relate it to other information it might have about the clients. For example, if a sequence of queries q1, q2, q3 is always followed by a stock-exchange action, a curious server can learn about the content of these queries, even though they are encrypted, and predict the user action when the same (or similar) sequence of queries appears again. Moreover, it is possible to analyze the importance of different areas in the database, e.g., by counting the frequency of the client accessing the same data items. If the server is an adversary with significant but limited power, it can concentrate its resources in trying to for the symmetric encryption variant of "search on encrypted data", where a client stores data (e.g. mail messages) remotely, and wishes to use the data while protecting its privacy (see, e.g. [30] ).
Oblivious RAM can also be used for protecting against cache attacks, which are software side-channel attacks run by monitoring the state of the CPU's memory cache. Cache attacks reveal memory access patterns which can be used for cryptanalysis of cryptographic algorithms, by examining data-dependent table lookups. These attacks have been demonstrated to reveal AES keys in real systems [24] . As noted in [24] , an oblivious RAM can hide these access patterns, but at a cost which is definitely unacceptable for basic CPU operations.
The basic ideas behind our new construction We base our solution on the Goldreich-Ostrovsky hierarchical solution, which is described in Sect. 2.1 and Appendix A. We improve its overhead by using the following primitives instead of the original components of the construction.
• Cuckoo Hashing. In the Goldreich-Ostrovsky construction the client maps data items into bins using a random hash function that is kept secret from the server. The number of items mapped into each bin must be hidden from the server. It is well known that when n items are randomly mapped to n bins then (with high probability) the most populated bin contains O(log n) items. Therefore in the original construction the client sets each bin to have sufficient room for O(log n) items, and stores in a bin fake items if less than this number of items are mapped to it. This increases the overall storage required by the construction to O(n log n).
In comparison, our construction uses Cuckoo hashing [25, 26] , which is a hashing scheme mapping n items to 2(1 + )n bins with the guarantee that at most a single item is mapped into a bin. Consequently, the construction uses a total of only O(n) server storage.
• Pseudo-random permutation. The server observes where items are inserted to the Cuckoo hash table, and might use this information to identify "dummy" items (a discussion of the usage of dummy items is given in Sect. 4). In order to prevent that, the client needs to apply a pseudo-random permutation to the order of the items before inserting them to the hash table.
• Randomized Shell sort. The storage system is built of hierarchical levels. Periodically, the items of two adjacent levels are reshuffled. The reshuffling process uses sorting, which is composed of many steps where the client retrieves a pair of encrypted items from the server, decrypts them and compares the results, and stores a re-encrypted version of the sorted pair. The sorting must be oblivious in the sense that the indices of the pair of items that are compared must not leak any information about the results of previous comparisons. The original Goldreich-Ostrovsky construction uses a sorting network for this purpose, but this solution has an overhead of O(n log 2 n) comparisons, with a very small constant, using Batcher's network [6] , or O(n log n) comparisons, with a constant of about 6100, using the AKS network [3] . We perform sorting using the new randomized Shell sort algorithm of Goodrich [14] . This algorithm is oblivious, sorts with very high probability, and works in O(n log n) comparisons; where the "O" notation hides only a very small constant.
We stress that even given these improved primitive building blocks, a lot of care had to be taken in order to compose them to a secure, and efficient, oblivious RAM protocol. Additional effort was needed in order to reduce the constant factors of the overhead.
Basics of Oblivious RAMs
The problem of hiding access patterns is modeled in the following way: The setting includes a client which has a small secure memory, and a server with a large insecure storage. The client can use the server's storage to store and retrieve its data. The client stores internally a secret key of a symmetric encryption scheme, and uses it to encrypt the data before storing it, and decrypt it after retrieving it.
We assume here and throughout the paper that encryption is done with a semantically secure probabilistic encryption scheme and therefore two encrypted copies of the same data look different. The server cannot identify whether these two copies correspond to the same data of the client.
The client has n data items denoted as (v i , x i ), where i = 1, . . . , n is an index, v i is the data identifier or location-index (e.g., a serial number), different for each data item, and x i is the data payload. It is assumed that all x i values are of the same length. To simplify the description we assume that the storage service of the server has slots of a size which is equal to the size of an encryption of a data item used by the client. Therefore each slot can be used to store a data item, where the client can ask to store a specific data item in a specific slot location j. All requests to the server are therefore of the form "GET j", which provides the client with the (encrypted) content of slot j, or "PUT data j", which stores at slot j the encrypted data provided by the client.
The client has a small amount of secure internal memory. It includes space for O(1) data items, for O(1) secret keys for symmetric key cryptographic functions, and for a constant number of counters which count up to n and therefore are of length O(log n) bits. (We stress that the length of these counters is very small, and a counter can therefore be instantiated by a single 32 or 64 bit word. The data items themselves are typically much longer, in particular in the "remote storage in the cloud" application, where a data item might be a block of a few KBytes at the least. Fortunately, the client needs to store locally only O(1) of these data items.)
We assume that the server does not tamper and modify the stored data, because this issue can be easily solved by the client authenticating the stored data using a message authentication code (MAC) and a secret key known only to the client. However, the server does learn which location in its storage is being accessed by the client in each operation.
By default, the client cannot hide the fact that it accesses a specific location in the server's storage. The server can examine the contents of its storage and of the requests from the client, but the server obviously cannot learn the contents of the stored data, since it is encrypted. The goal of the client is to hide its access pattern to the stored data. This is expressed in the following definition. ((v 1 , x 1 ) Hiding the access patterns, or "unifying" them, must have a cost -each access is simulated by more than one access. First, we would like to make the different types of accesses look the same. For example, if we want that read and write would be indistinguishable, we would have each of them both implement read and write, i.e., read the value in the accessed location, decrypt it and then rewrite it with an encryption of the same value or a different one. Note that since we use a semantically secure probabilistic encryption, the server cannot identify whether the data was changed before it was written back. We note that this element of making different types of data access look the same, by always using a read-and-then-write operation, is common for all the following solutions. From here on, we treat all read, write, or other access-operation, as equal. Adding a write operation to each read operation already multiplies the computational overhead by a factor of two. In addition, we would like to prevent the adversary from distinguishing between accesses to locations {v 1 , v 2 , v 3 } and {v 2 , v 1 , v 2 }, etc. A trivial solution is to read and rewrite the entire set of stored data for each access. Applying this solution is usually infeasible, since it multiplies the computational overhead by a factor equal to the number of stored items, which is normally huge. On the other hand, it is easy to see that this is the best possible deterministic scheme. A probabilistic scheme, where the operation of the client depends on a random bits, can do much better.
Definition 1. The input y of the client is a sequence of data items, denoted by

Related Work
Most oblivious RAM constructions are based on the client having access to a secret (pseudo-)random function, which is implemented using symmetric cryptographic functionalities, such as encryption, and can therefore be constructed assuming the existence of one-way functions. Very recent results of Ajtai [2] and of Damgård et. al. [10] construct an oblivious RAM based on no cryptographic assumption (but rather, letting the client use the oblivious RAM itself for storing random coin tosses and accessing them obliviously). The client needs to store an equivalent to a poly-logarithmic amount of items, rather than O(1) items in our scheme, and each data request is replaced with a poly-logarithmic number of requests to the server. It is not clear how high is the exponent of this poly-logarithmic overhead. We therefore focus our description of related work on cryptographic oblivious RAM schemes. We start our description of related work with a description of the hierarchical solution of Goldreich and Ostrovsky [13] , since this is the base scheme from which we start our work. We then describe concisely the performance of other schemes.
The construction of Goldreich-Ostrovsky uses a primitive which performs an oblivious sorting of the stored data. That is, it sorts the stored data items according to some index, while hiding from the server all information about the permutation that orders the input set of data items. (For example, the server must not learn what was the previous location of the item which was moved to the head of the sorted items). An easy way to achieve this obliviousness is by using a sorting algorithm that accesses items in a predefined order, which is independent of the results of comparisons that the algorithm performs. In particular, they use a sorting network for this purpose, either the sorting network of Batcher [6] which performs O(n log 2 n) read operations with a very small constant (approximately 1/2), or the sorting network of AKS [3] which performs only O(n log n) read operations, but whose complexity has a much larger constant. (The actual overhead of the AKS sorting network is about 6100n log n comparisons, and therefore it is clear that for any feasible input, the performance of the Batcher network is preferable.)
The Hierarchical Solution
Structure The hierarchical solution uses a data structure composed of levels, where each level is twice the size of the former level. In each level, items are mapped to locations based on a random secret hash function. For n items, there are N = O(log n) levels, each of them is a hash-table with 2 i buckets (i = 1 . . . N ), where each bucket contains O(log n) items. The total memory size is O(n log n) items.
Lookup Any access to the data structure is composed of both a read and a write. First, the entire first level is sequentially scanned (i.e., is being read to the secure memory and decrypted); Second, in each of the other levels, one bucket, chosen by a hash function which looks random to anyone but the client, is entirely scanned. The item which was searched for is found in one of these two steps. Then, it is re-encrypted and written into the first level. It must be emphasized that when the requested item is found in a certain level, the process continues as usual in the following levels, except that a random dummy item is looked for, instead of the original requested item.
Reshuffling levels Since any access includes writing to the first level, this level becomes full and the data stored in it should be "moved down" to the next level. Similarly, after 2 i data access requests level i is moved down to level i + 1. This is done by re-shuffling the data from both levels into the larger (lower) level, using a new random hash function, that is kept secret from the server. The reshuffling algorithm is the most complex component of the protocol and is its performance bottleneck. Reshuffling is composed of multiple scans of the data, obliviously sorting it several times, removing duplicate items, adding dummy items, tagging the items using the new random secret hash function and mapping them to buckets. The amortized computational overhead of reshuffling is O(log 3 n) per data request (using the AKS network [3] , whose constant is about 6100; using Batcher's network [6] results in a total amortized overhead of O(log 4 n) with more reasonable constants).
A more detailed description of the Goldreich-Ostrovsky Hierarchical Solution can be found in Appendix A. For a full description, including formal proofs, we refer the reader to their original paper [13] .
The "Square Root" Algorithm
The square root algorithm was presented by Goldreich and Ostrovsky as a methodic step towards the more efficient and complex hierarchical solution described above. We present this basic solution since its overhead is smaller than that of the hierarchical solution for data sets of reasonable size; in addition, subsequent work of Iliev and Smith [15, 16] was based on this construction.
In the square-root solution the n items are stored in a storage of size n + 2 √ n, which includes a "cache" of size √ n into which all modified items are written. The number of actual accesses to the data storage is larger by a factor of O( √ n · log n) than in a naive storage. The algorithm is divided to epochs, each composed of √ n client's requests. Each request involves O( √ n) accesses to the data (including a scan of the entire cache), and in addition at the end of each epoch the entire data must be sorted.
A more detailed description of the Goldreich-Ostrovsky square-root algorithm can be found in Appendix B. For a full description, we refer the reader to their original paper [13] . For a short description of the work of Iliev and Smith see Appendix C.
Using Merge Sort
Williams and Sion [32] present a solution based on the hierarchical solution of Goldreich and Ostrovsky, while assuming that the client can locally store O( √ n) data items, rather than O(1) as in our scheme and the scheme of [13] . This extended amount of local storage enables to reduce the number of accesses to the server to be only a factor of O(log 2 n) larger than the number of item requests. This property is achieved using an oblivious merge sort algorithm, which takes advantage of the following fact: when two sorted lists of random items are merged to a single list, it holds with overwhelming probability, for each index i, that among the first i items in the merged list at most i/2 + O( √ i) are from either one of the two lists. Given this fact the oblivious merge sort algorithm can simply read items at a constant rate from the two lists (which were sorted recursively), and output, also in a constant rate, the sorted merged list. The fact ensures that the merge sort algorithm is oblivious and yet does not run out of the O( √ n) secure local storage. A short description of this solution can be found in Appendix D.
Using Bloom Filters
The construction of Williams et al. in [33] is based on the client storing at the server, for every level, an encrypted Bloom filter [8] , and using it, together with the merge sort based construction of [32] , in order to check whether an item appears in the level. The client again needs to use local storage of size O( √ n). The work in [33] claims to reduce the storage overhead at the server to O(n), and to reduce the number of actual data requests per item requested by the client to only O(log n log log n). That analysis is based on the assumption that the size of the Bloom filter encoding m items is O(m). We show in Appendix E that the overhead is actually larger, since the size of the Bloom filter must also be a function of the number of the hash functions used and of the allowed error probability (which in inevitable when a Bloom filter is used). As a result, the overhead of the Bloom filter based scheme is worse than that of our scheme for any reasonable choice of the number of items n and of the error probability of the filter (see Table 1 below).
computational overhead client memory server storage (data items) (data items) Goldreich-Ostrovsky [13] √ [33] , we note that the original analysis is inaccurate. In the second line, h is the number of hash functions used in the Bloom filter, and the error probability is 2 −c . The third line is for an invocation using an optimal number h of hash functions, with specific numbers for an error probability of 2 −64 ; see analysis in Appendix E.) Table 1 compares the performance of all access hiding schemes described in this section. Note that for the Bloom filter based scheme [33] the first line of the table lists the performance according to the original analysis in [33] , which is inaccurate. The second and third lines list the performance according to our analysis in Appendix E, assuming an allowed error probability of 2 −c . The O(log n log log n) overhead in the third line has a constant factor of at least 1.44c (greater than 92 for c = 64), in addition to other constant factors which are similar to those incurred by all schemes. Given this finer analysis, the performance of [33] is worse than the performance of our scheme when log n < 1.44c log log n, which is clearly the case for any reasonable choices of n and c. For example, for n < 2 80 this holds for any error parameter c ≥ 9.
A Comparison of All Schemes
The performance comparison can be summarized as follows:
• The constructions of Goldreich-Ostrovsky and of our work are the only ones using local storage of only O(1) data items.
• The computational overhead of our construction is better or equal to that of all other constructions (except for the asymptotic overhead of the Bloom filter construction for unreasonably high values of n).
• The amount of server storage in our construction is better than that of all other constructions (except for the Bloom filer construction, which stores a comparable number of data items and in addition 1.44cn bits, which are more than 92n bits for c = 64).
3 Building Blocks
Randomized Shell Sort (Oblivious Sorting Algorithm)
Goodrich's recent randomized Shell sort algorithm [14] is an efficient sorting algorithm, using only O(n log n) comparisons with a relatively small constant factor. Equally important is the fact that this algorithm is also data oblivious. This property means that if we assume that the operation of comparing two items and reordering them according to their value is a black-box (i.e., the result of the comparison is hidden from an external observer, which is the server in our case), then the algorithm performs no operations which depend on the relative order of the elements in the input array. In other words, an external observer who can only observe the items which the algorithm compares, but not the results of the comparisons, sees a list of pairs of items which are compared, where the choice of items for these pairs is independent of the results of previous comparisons. We note that other sorting algorithms are not known to be both oblivious and efficient. For example, bubble sort is oblivious, but is not efficient; quick sort is efficient (in the average case) but is not oblivious; sorting networks are oblivious, but, as noted in Sect. 1, the only sorting network constructions of size O(n log n) are not efficient in the practical sense, due to large constants. See [3, 9, 20, 14] for details.
We use randomized Shell sort in our scheme in order to reorder items in the server database, according to a new permutation, in a way that prevents the server from tracking the new ordering. The details of the randomized Shell sort construction appear in [14] and in Appendix F .
Cuckoo Hashing
Cuckoo hashing [25, 26] is a relatively new hashing algorithm, which in its basic form maps each item to one of two potential entries of a hash table, while ensuring constant lookup and deletion time in the worst case, and amortized constant time for insertions.
The basic idea of Cuckoo hashing is to use two hash functions denoted h 0 and h 1 (or multiple hash functions in the general case). The size of a hash table used for storing n items must be slightly larger than 2n (to simplify the discussion, we consider the size of the table to be exactly 2n). When a new item x is inserted to the hash table, it is inserted to location h 0 (x). If this location is already occupied by another real items dummy items size epoch-length "moved down" level i item y, then that item is "kicked out" of its current location and is re-located to its other possible location.
, and initially b = 0) then item y is moved to location
, and so on. If this chain of relocations continues for too long, then the table is rehashed using two new hash functions h 0 , h 1 . In this case the insertion time is longer, but analysis shows that this event is rare, and therefore the amortized insertion time is constant. Lookup and deletion are natural -one just has to check the two possible locations of the given item. Most recent works (e.g., [17, 18, 19, 4, 5] ) present variants of Cuckoo hashing with guaranteed constant worst-case performance for insertion (this is also referred to as de-amortizing the insertion time of Cuckoo hashing).
Our Scheme
We first describe the basic form of our oblivious RAM scheme, which has the desired asymptotic overhead. Section 5 then describes how to improve the constant factors of the overhead of the scheme.
The construction is based on combining a modified version of the hierarchical solution of Goldreich and Ostrovsky with Cuckoo hashing and randomized Shell sort. The server stores the data, which can potentially consist of n items, in a hierarchical data structure of N = log 2 n + 1 levels, each of which is twice larger than its previous 1 . Additional levels may be allocated, as necessary (when a new level is allocated, its size is twice the size of the last allocated level).
In the original scheme of Goldreich-Ostrovsky, level i consists of 2 i buckets, where each bucket contains O(log n) entries. In our scheme level i consists of a table of 4 · 2 i single item entries, which will be used to store up to 2 i data items of the client. Storing the items is done in the following way: Along with the 2 i items of the client, up to 2 i "dummy" items might be stored in the level, where the client might access a dummy item in order to hide the fact that it does not need to search for a real item in this level (since the real item was already found in a previous level). All 2 · 2 i items of the level are stored in a Cuckoo hashing table of size 4 · 2 i . (We note that according to this description the first level is used to store only two items. Any actual implementation would probably set the first level to be much larger, say, to contain 128 data items. To simplify the analysis we assume, however, that the first level stores only two items.)
For each level we associate an epoch, which is defined for level i as 2 i−1 requests (the epoch ends when a reshuffle from level i − 1 to level i occurs). For each level i and its th epoch, the client randomly chooses two hash functions whose ranges are {1 . . . Each data request includes both reading and writing to the data structure, such that the server cannot distinguish which operation occurred. In addition, for any request, the accessed item is re-encrypted by the client, using a probabilistic encryption scheme.
Data requests Initially, the data structure is empty. For each request (of any type) of a location-index (virtual address) v, the following operations are performed. 2 1. Scan through the entire first level in a sequential order to find the item whose location-index is v. This step includes reading all the items in the first level. If the requested item is found, it is stored in the client's secure memory, and the process continues as usual.
2. Go through all other levels, and for each level i = 2 . . . N , do:
• If v has not been found yet, examine its two possible locations in the Cuckoo hashing table of the current level (i):
. If the requested item is found in one of the two locations, it is stored in the client's secure memory, and the process continues as usual.
• If v has been found, examine two random locations h i,
where t is a counter which is increased with every data request. (These are locations allocated by the Cuckoo hashing for two fresh dummy items which were not searched for before.) 3. Scan again through the entire first level in a sequential order, and write back the updated (and reencrypted) item of location-index v in the next available location. If v is already in the first level, overwrite it. This step includes reading and writing all items of the first level.
The first level functions as a cache, meaning that for any request, the updated value is written to the first level. Since the capacity of the level is final, after a certain number of requests it becomes full. In order to avoid this, the content of the first level is "moved down" to the second level before the first level becomes potentially exhausted. Now the second level may become full, so the same process is repeated. When the content of the last level has to be "moved down", a new level with twice the number of entries is allocated. 3 "Moving down" the content of level i is done every 2 i requests. This makes sure that no level is overflowed, and that the first level is emptied and has enough available slots at the beginning of each epoch of any of the levels (since the beginning of an epoch of level i is also a beginning of an epoch of all the levels j < i). In fact, this process makes sure that at any time level i contains no more than 2 i items, as is stated in Lemma 1 below. Whenever level i is moved down to level i + 1, the latter level is reshuffled.
When the client moves the content of level i to level i + 1, it obliviously hashes the content of both levels to level i + 1. This reshuffling must fulfill the following requirements: (1) If there is a duplicate item (the same location-index, and possibly different data content) in level i and level i + 1, the newer item (from level i) must be kept, and the older one must be deleted; (2) The resulting buffer, namely level i + 1 after the reshuffling, must be ordered independently of any of the levels before the reshuffling; (3) Level i must be cleaned, i.e., its content must be deleted 4 . As we continue, we see that all these requirements are fulfilled.
Before describing the reshuffle process, we state a fact and a lemma which will be useful in analyzing the reshuffle. Proof. The proof follows by induction. The fact trivially holds for the first level. Now, a reshuffle from level i to level i + 1 occurs at times t where t mod 2 i = 0, i.e. at times where reshuffling occurs for all levels lower than i. The reshuffling is run just after the reshuffle from level i − 1 to level i ends. By the step of the induction, at that time all levels j ≤ i − 1 are empty. The reshuffling process itself empties level i. 
Reshuffling Levels Using Cuckoo Hashing and Randomized Shell Sort
The reshuffle of levels i and i + 1 into level i + 1 is a complex process, consisting of the steps enumerated below and based on two basic primitives: (1) Scanning, which is reading and (possibly) writing in a sequential order all the items in a given buffer; (2) Oblivious Sorting (O-Sort), which is done by randomized Shell sort (see Sect. 3.1). Note that whenever an item is written to a storage (whether it is one of the levels or a temporary buffer), it is re-encrypted. The reshuffle process is also depicted in Fig. 1. 1. Allocate a temporary buffer C, whose size is 2 i+1 . (Recall that jointly, both levels contain at most 2 i+1 real items).
O-sort each of the levels (level i and level i + 1):
The sorting is according to an order which locates real items before dummy and empty items. At the end of this step, all the real items of level i (at most 2 i ) are in its first locations, and all the real items of level i+1 (at most 2 i ) are in its first locations.
In the following two steps (3-4), 2 i+1 items that include all the real items of the two levels are copied into the temporary buffer. Step I of Fig. 1.) 4. Move the first 2 i items from level i + 1 to the right side of C. Mark each item as "old". At the end of this step there are 2 i+1 items in C, that include all the real items of both levels and possibly additional items (if both levels together contained less than 2 i+1 real items). (This step is depicted in
Step II of Fig. 1 .)
The goal of the following two steps (5-6) is to erase duplications of items with the same locationindices.
O-sort C according to these criterions (ordered): (a) smaller location-indices (virtual addresses) first, (b) items tagged "new" before items tagged "old". (This step is depicted in
Step III of Fig. 1 ).
6. Removing duplicates: Sequentially scan C and erase each old item preceded by a new item with the same location-index (the marks "old" and "new" of the remaining items can be ignored from now on). Replace each erased item and each dummy item with a random item (an item with a special location-index and random content). At the end of this step there are 2 i+1 real and random items in C, without duplications. We will refer to all these items in the sequel as "real". (This step is depicted in
Step IV of Fig. 1.) 7. Create 2 i+1 dummy items with indices "dummy" •(t + j), where t is a counter of the number of requests so far and j = 1 . . . 2 i+1 . 5 Add these items to C (this requires increasing the size of C from 2 i+1 to 2 i+2 ). (This step is depicted in Step V of Fig. 1 .)
The client then obliviously reorders the items in a pseudo-random order. This is done by (1) choosing a new keyed pseudo-random function F k and using it to tag each of the 2 i+2 items with a new value which is the result of and repeat the previous step.
After step 4, all the real content of levels i and i + 1 is in C (possibly with additional items), Steps 5 and 6 handle possible duplications (of items with the same location-index in the two original buffers), Step 7 reorders the real and dummy items (pseudo-) randomly, and Steps 8 and 9 insert the items to level i + 1, according to the random secret Cuckoo hashing functions.
Analysis and Implementation
Overhead.
The construction uses log n levels, where level i contains 4 · 2 i = O(2 i ) items, yielding a server storage of O(n) data items. The overall amortized computational overhead is O(log 2 n) data requests for each original request of the client: First, observe that accessing an item requires scanning through the first level (which is of constant size), and then accessing two locations in each other level. The reshuffling process uses randomized Shell sort that sorts elements in O( log ) time, with a reasonable constant factor. Performing the oblivious sorting is the main time-consuming element of the reshuffle process. The size of the sorted array in level i is O(2 i ), giving a sorting time of O(2 i log 2 i ) = O(2 i · i) for level i. Level i is sorted every 2 i requests, giving an amortized cost of
Summing this for all the levels gives
Examining the performance more carefully, we note that level i has room for 4 · 2 i items (Sect. 5 shows how to reduce the storage by about 50%). The bulk of the computation overhead comes from the sorting operations. In particular, Step 2 sorts level i+1, which consists of 4·2 i+1 items (the other sorting operations are applied to smaller sets of items). However, we show in Sect. 5 how the sort operations in Step 2 can be changed to sort half as many items. This is estimated to reduce the overhead by 33%. Section 5 discusses an additional optimization which reduces the constant factors of the overhead of the construction by an additional 33%.
Security. Theorem 2. The oblivious RAM protocol described above is secure according to Definition 1.
Proof. The security of the construction holds under the assumption of the existence of pseudo-random functions, or assuming that the client has access to random functions (e.g., an internal random number generator which always provides the same output when given the same input). The PRF assumption is probably more reasonable for most applications. A crucial ingredient of the protocol is that the hash functions h 0 and h 1 , used to map items during the Cuckoo hashing, are randomly chosen by the client and are kept secret from the server. (When a PRF is used, these functions are defined by some function F k () where the key k is chosen by the client and is unknown to the server.)
We will show that for any input sequence y of the client, the access pattern A(y) to the storage server is indistinguishable, by a polynomial-time server, from an access pattern A which can be simulated without any knowledge of y, except for the length of y.
The contents of the requests in the access pattern are encrypted with a semantically secure probabilistic encryption scheme, and therefore the server cannot distinguish between the contents of the requests in A(y) and in A . We therefore only need to show that the locations accessed by the two access patterns in the server's memory are indistinguishable. Consider the reshuffle operation from level i to level i + 1. The first steps of the reshuffle perform an oblivious sorting or a serial scan of data items, and are therefore independent of the actual data stored by the client and of the input sequence y. As such they can be easily simulated. Namely, the simulated access pattern A contains a serial scan in every step of the reshuffle where such a scan in performed (namely, Steps 1, 3, 4 and 6). In addition, whenever the reshuffle performs an oblivious sorting (in Steps 2, 5 and 7), A performs an oblivious sorting assuming that the values to be sorted are 1, 2, 3, . . ..
Let M = 2 i+1 . In
Step 7 of the protocol the client obliviously reorders in a pseudo-random order M real values and M dummy values.
Step 8 maps these 2M values to a Cuckoo hash table of size 4M , using two hash functions h 0 and h 1 which are chosen at random by the client and are unknown to the server. The client goes over the 2M items according to their new order, and attempts to insert each of them to the table according to the Cuckoo hashing algorithm. If x is a certain item in the list, then the client probes locations h 0 (x) and h 1 (x) in the table and might perform some evictions of items to find a place for x. In this process the server might learn the h 0 and h 1 values of each of the 2M items. However, since the server does not know the hash functions used, these values are independent of the actual values of the items. Simulating this process is performed in the following way: Define random functions h 0 , h 1 , and apply the Cuckoo hashing algorithm to an arbitrary set of 2M values, say the values 1 . . . 2M , using these functions. This process results in exactly the same distribution, as in the real execution, for all the events observed by the server, including the locations probed in the hash table and the occurrences of evictions and cycles (which might cause a repeat of the Cuckoo hashing algorithm as defined by Step 9) . Note that our security analysis does not have to analyze the exact probabilities with which evictions and cycles occur, but rather only observe that these probabilities are independent of the data items being hashed.
At the end of the hashing process the server knows, for each of the 2M items, the two locations to which this item is mapped by h 0 and h 1 , and the exact location in this pair to which this item was eventually mapped. Recall, however, that the 2M items were randomly reordered, and that half of them are dummy items. In the epoch that follows, the server can observe which locations are probed in each request of this level. Namely, it might see that the j th request probes locations 10 and 17 to which, say, the first of the 2M items is mapped. However, the server does not know whether this is a real or a dummy item. Also, each item hashed into this level is probed at most once during the epoch, since each dummy value is probed at most once (due to the dummy counter being increased), and a real value that is accessed is immediately moved to the top level and is not accessed again in this level during the current epoch. Given these observations, the probes to the level in this epoch can be simulated in the following way: use the random functions h 0 , h 1 that were used in the simulation of the Cuckoo hashing into this level; let (a 1 , . . . , a 2M ) be a random permutation of the numbers 1, . . . , 2M ; when performing the jth data request from level i + 1 in the current epoch, probe the locations to which item a j is mapped by h 0 and h 1 .
We have described above how to simulate probes to a specific level during data requests. The entire sequence of probes during data request can therefore be simulated as follows: In Steps 1 and 3 the simulation scans the entire first level. In Step 2 the simulation goes through all levels, starting with the second one, and simulates a pair of probes to each level, as is described in the previous paragraph.
Implementation.
We implemented a basic prototype of our scheme, including the hierarchical data structures, the randomized Shellsort algorithm and the Cuckoo hashing algorithm. This allowed us to simulate the operation of the oblivious RAM construction, and to measure and estimate its performance. We chose Java as an initial platform and compiled using the Sun JDK 1.6.0 16. The testing environment was a standard PC, whose properties are: Intel Core 2 Quad CPU, Q9400 @ 2.66GHz, 2.67 Ghz, 3.25 GB of RAM, Physical Address Extension. The operating system was Windows XP, Service Pack 3.
In our measurements we ignored network delays, and therefore we only provide measurements of the number of operations per data request, rather than of the amount of time each request takes.
We ran experiments on various databases, of sizes between n = 2 10 and n = 2 20 . For a database of n = 2 i potential items, we ran k = 2 i − 10 requests, and counted the number of read/write operations handled by the server. The results appear in Table 3 . The constant of the O(k log 2 k) overhead seems to be about 160. We note that the three improvements described in Sect. 5, (minimizing the amount of sorted log 2 n n k = n − 10 k log 2 k #operations ops per const of (# of req.)
request O(k log 2 k) items -either by not sorting empty items, or by using an advanced Cuckoo hashing algorithm; avoiding duplicate items, and reshuffling several levels together) which have not yet been implemented by us, are estimated to reduce the overhead by about 33%, 16% and 33%, respectively. Applying both optimizations is likely to reduce the overhead by about 63%, and obtain a constant of about 60 in the "O" notation.
Optimizing the Construction
We present here several optimizations to the basic oblivious RAM construction presented in Sect. 4. The optimizations improve the constant factors of the overhead, although not its asymptotic performance, and are beneficial for any implementation of the construction.
Storing Less Items
Not storing empty items Recall that each level i contains up to 2 i real items and 2 i dummy items which must be indistinguishable, from the server's point of view, from the real items. The remaining 2 i+1 locations in this level are empty, and are needed for the Cuckoo hashing to succeed. The construction can be optimized by not storing in these locations encrypted "empty" data items, but rather using a flag signaling that the entry is empty. Since we can safely assume that a data item is much larger than this flag, this optimization saves about 50% of the storage required by the levels. As for security, note that this change enables the server to identify empty locations, but it does not enable it to distinguish between real items and dummy items. Namely, this corresponds to revealing to the server the empty locations in a Cuckoo hashing table, but since the hash functions used are kept secret, no information is revealed about the items in the table.
Implication to sorting
Step 2 of the reshuffle algorithm sorts levels i and i + 1, whose lengths are 4 · 2 i and 8 · 2 i , respectively. These sorting operations are done in order to move the real items to the beginning of these buffers. If empty items are flagged, as suggested above, then there is no need to sort the corresponding entries in the level. Namely, the data to be sorted is half as long as in the basic protocol, and the overhead of sorting is reduced by more than 50%.
Let us therefore estimate how much is saved by this optimization. Note that Steps 5 and 7 sort 2 · 2 i and 4 · 2 i items, respectively. Assume that the overhead of sorting is linear (this is roughly the case when comparing the overhead of sorting adjacent levels, which are of similar sizes). Before the optimization, the algorithm sorts buffers of sizes 4 · 2 i , 8 · 2 i , 2 · 2 i and 4 · 2 i , which are of total length 18 · 2 i . After the optimization, it sorts buffers of sizes 2 · 2 i , 4 · 2 i , 2 · 2 i and 4 · 2 i , which are of total length 12 · 2 i . The overhead of sorting, which is the bulk of the overhead of the entire construction, is therefore reduced by about 33%.
Using an advanced Cuckoo hashing scheme The basic Cuckoo hashing scheme used in our construction utilizes approximately only 50% of its storage to store real and dummy items, while the remaining storage is empty. The new Backyard Cuckoo hashing [5] algorithm has a much better space utilization -in order to store n items, it requires only (1 + )n storage. Using this scheme has therefore the same effect as the optimization suggested above, of not storing empty entries in the hash table: it saves about 50% of the storage required by each level in the hierarchical structure. In addition, the overhead of each sorting operation is reduced by more than 50%, and the overhead of the entire construction is reduced by about 33%.
Avoiding Duplication in the Lookup Stage
Steps 5-6 of the reshuffle algorithm perform an oblivious sorting and a linear scan in order to removed duplicate occurrences of items which appear in both level i and level i + 1. This duplication occurs when an item is read from level i + 1, and its updated version is written to the top level. An alternative way of preventing duplication is not to have duplicate items in the first place, by deleting the "old" copy of the item in level i + 1 when it is being read during a data request. We describe next how this optimization can be done.
During a data request, the algorithm searches for the requested item in all levels. In each level the algorithm probes two locations. When the location in which the item is stored is found, it must be written back with a default encrypted invalid value. All other probed locations are written back with their previous values, also re-encrypted. In other words, in each level the client reads two locations and writes back values to these locations. For all locations but the one in which the seeked item is found, the values written back are re-encryptions of the original values. In the location in which the desired item was found, the client writes back a default encrypted invalid value.
This modification of the scheme saves one sorting of the temporary buffer in the reshuffling process, at the cost of additional write operations in the lookup process. I.e., for each lookup we add 2 log n writes, but we save a sorting which costs O(2 i+1 log 2 i+1 ) operations per a reshuffle of levels i and i + 1. The reshuffle of level i occurs every 2 i lookups, and therefore we save there O(2 log 2 i+1 ) = O(i) operations per lookup. Summing over all levels i = 1, . . . , log n we save about O(log 2 n) operations per lookup. In Sect. 5.1 we estimated that in the original algorithm sorting costs about 18 · 2 i operations per level, whereas after the optimization of that section the overhead of sorting is reduced to 12 · 2 i . The optimization we presented here removes a sorting of 2 i+1 items, whose overhead according to that approximation is about 2 · 2 i . This reduces the overhead of the sorting operations to 10 · 2 i , which is an addition improvement of 16%.
Reshuffling Several Levels Together
In time t, where t mod 2 i = 0, and t mod 2 i+1 = 0, the basic construction performs subsequent reshuffles of levels 1, 2, . . . , i. These reshuffles include many redundant steps. (For example, the first reshuffle inserts dummy items into the second level. Then, the reshuffle of the second level begins by (possibly) removing these items. Furthermore, the first reshuffle fills the second level, while the second reshuffle empties it.) Instead, it is possible to reshuffle together in a single step the contents of all these levels into level i + 1. According to our estimates this optimization saves an additional 33% of the total overhead.
Overall Effect
Combining the different optimizations presented above, the overhead of reshuffling is reduced to about (10/18) · (2/3) = 37% of its original overhead, a saving of about 65%.
Open Questions
The efficiency analysis of our construction, as well as that of all other known constructions of oblivious RAM, is amortized. A data request which is followed by a reshuffle of level i has a larger overhead than a request which requires a reshuffle of a level j < i, or one that does not require any reshuffling. A major open goal is, therefore, to reduce the worst case performance of oblivious RAM. Note that the recent result on deamortizing Cuckoo hash [4] does not help here, since it can be applied to the Cuckoo hashing part of the the reshuffling process, but not to the fact that the worst case overhead of reshuffling is high.
1. Scan through the entire first level in a sequential order to find an item whose location-index is v. This step includes reading all the items in the first level. If the requested item is found, it is stored in the client's secure memory, but the process continues as usual. If more than a single item is found, the last item found is stored.
• If v has not yet been found, scan through the entire bucket h i,j (v) in level i (h i,j is a hash function whose range is {1 . . . 2 i } used by level i in its j th epoch; the bucket size is O(log n)). If the requested item is found, it is stored in the client's secure memory, and the process continues as usual. This step includes sequentially reading all the items in the scanned bucket.
• If v has been found, scan through the entire bucket whose index is h i,j ("dummy • t), where t is a counter for the number of requests till now (this gives a randomly chosen dummy value). This step includes sequentially reading all items in the scanned bucket.
3. Scan again through the entire first level in a sequential order, and write back the updated (re-encrypted) item of location-index v, in the next available location. If v is already in the first level, overwrite it. This step includes reading and writing all the items in the first level.
Notice that all the operations that are done for each request do not reveal any information on the address accessed. Steps 1 and 3 scan an entire level, and are identical for any access.
Step 2 always goes through all the levels (except the first level), regardless of whether the requested item was found already or not, and the bucket is selected using a random hash function applied to a fresh input. This bucket, in turn, is completely scanned. The number of access operations in steps 1 − 3 for each request is O(log 2 n). Steps 1 and 3 access the entire first level, whose size is O(log n), step 2 goes through N = O(log n) levels, and on each level it access a whole bucket, whose size is O(log n).
The first level essentially functions as a cache, meaning that for any request, the updated value is written to the first level. Since the capacity of this level is final, after a certain number of requests, the first level becomes full. In order to avoid this, the content of the first level is "moved down" to the second level. Now the second level may become full, so the same process is repeated. When the content of the last level (level N ) has to be "moved down", a new level with twice the number of buckets is allocated.
"Moving down" the content of level i is done at the end of the ith epoch, i.e. every 2 i requests, to ensure that a level is "moved down" before it becomes potentially exhausted. 7 This makes sure that no level is overflowed, and that the first level is emptied and has enough available slots at the beginning of each epoch of any of the levels (since the beginning of an epoch of level i is also a beginning of an epoch of all the levels j < i). In fact, this process makes sure that at any time, level i contains no more than 2 i items. Whenever level i is moved down to level i + 1, the lower level is reshuffled (and this happens at the end of an epoch).
Reshuffling levels When the client moves the content of level i to level i + 1, it obliviously hashes the content of both levels to level i + 1 and leaves level i empty. This reshuffling must ensure that if there is a duplicate item (with the same location-index, and possibly different data content) in levels i and i + 1, the newer item (from the upper level) is kept, and the older item is deleted. The resulting buffer, level i + 1 after 7 Actually, the first level becomes potentially exhausted only after log n requests, so moving it down could have been done after about log n requests, rather than 2 requests. The threshold of 2 i−1 is due to the last level, which might become full after 2 N −1 = log n. Asymptotically, applying the threshold of the last level to all the levels does not cost.
Ensuring that exactly m items are mapped to each bucket:
O-sort C according to these criterions (ordered): (a) tagged items before non-tagged ones, (b) lower tags first.
12. Scan C and clean it -erase the tagging and empty items that do not contain location-indices. Move the 2 i+1 · log n prefix of C to level i + 1.
After step 1, all the content of levels i and i + 1 is in the temporary buffer C; steps 2 and 3 handle the possible duplication of items with the same location-index in the two original buffers; steps 4 − 10 end with a tags-sorted array, where each tag is applied to exactly m items; step 11 deletes "spaces", such that the 2 i+1 · log n tagged items are located as the prefix of C, which is equivalent to 2 i+1 buckets of size log n, and this is copied (with some cleaning work) to level i + 1 in step 12.
Overhead: The main overhead of the reshuffle algorithm comes from running the oblivious sorting. Sorting is performed four times during the reshuffle of layer i, where the largest array sorted in this level is of length (2 i+2 +2 i+1 ) · log n (in Step 9) . Sorting this array using the AKS network takes O(2 i i log n) comparisons. The reshuffle happens every 2 i requests, so the amortized cost per request is O(i log n) comparisons. Summing this over levels i = 1, . . . , log n gives a total amortized overhead of O(log 3 n). Replacing the AKS network with Batcher's network which uses O(n log 2 n) comparisons results in a total amortized overhead of O(log 4 n). (Instead of using bucket of size O(log n) is every level it is possible to use buckets of size O(log i) in level i. This reduces the constant factors of the actual overhead but not its asymptotic performance.) B The "Square Root" Construction At the beginning of an epoch, the permuted area is being permuted, that is, a permutation P over the integers [1, n + √ n] is uniformly selected and the content of the permuted memory is obliviously relocated accordingly. Next, for each client's requests, to location-index i, the following is performed.
1. Scan through the entire shelter in a sequential order to find an item whose location-index is i. This step includes reading all the items in the shelter. If the requested item is found, it is stored in the client's secure memory, and the process continues as usual.
2. If the item is not found in the shelter, access the actual location P (i) in the permuted area. The requested item is there, and is now being stored in the client's secure memory. If the item is found in the shelter, access the next dummy item (in the location P (n + j) where j is the number of the step in this epoch).
3. Scan again through the entire shelter in a sequential order, and write back the updated (re-encrypted) item of location-index i, in the next available location. If i is already in the shelter, overwrite it. This step includes reading and writing all the items in the shelter.
It is easy to see, that steps 1 and 3 are trivially oblivious, in the sense that they are identical for each request.
Step 2 are oblivious due to the randomness of the permutation P .
At the end of an epoch, the values in the shelter are obliviously written to the permuted area. This can be done by obliviously sorting the entire storage (n + 2 √ n items) by the location-indices (dummy's index is infinite), and in case of duplication, leave the newer value, that is from the shelter, and modify the older's location-index to infinite. This practically replaces the old values that are in the permuted area with the new values that are in the shelter, and resets the shelter. This process with the permuting of the permuted area (at the beginning of each epoch), is called reshuffling.
The number of access operations in steps 1 − 3 for each request is O( √ n) (mainly due to steps 1 and 3). The number of access for the sorting during the moving of data at the end of an epoch is O(n log 2 n), divided by √ n (number of requests per epoch) gives a total overhead factor of O( √ n · log 2 n).
C Implementation of the "Square Root" Solution, using a Trusted Computing at the Server Iliev and Smith [15, 16] designed and implemented a secure storage system based on a variation of the "Square Root" algorithm (this algorithm was used because of its superior performance for reasonable size data sets). Their system used a secure co-processor (SCOP) as the client "representative" at the server machine. This makes the server more expensive but requires less communication. In addition, they improve the reshuffling procedure -they use Benes Permutation Network [7] instead of Batcher Sorting Network [6] (except the initial shuffle that is over all the database -which is done using a Batcher network) 9 . Other modifications they have introduced into the "Square Root" solution are the following:
• For efficiency, instead of scanning all the "shelter" for each request, the algorithm scans only the "active" items in the shelter, meaning that for the first request, no item is scanned in the shelter, for the second request -one item, and so on, such that the first requests are faster than the later.
• In the reshuffling procedure, they use a Luby-Rackoff cipher [21] as a pseudorandom permutation, instead of using a truly random permutation. This allows the SCOP to compute inverse permutations and composition of permutations, such that the SCOP should store only the last one or two permutations, and not the whole sequence of permutations.
• In the reshuffling procedure, they distinguish between items that have been "touched" since the previous reshuffling, and items that have not been "touched", and they require to shuffle only the "touched" items. Re-ordering (according to the new permutation) the untouched items is done in a non-oblivious way, and only the re-ordering of the touched items and the merging of the two groups of items must be done obliviously.
Criticism It is not clear how the distinction between "touched" and "untouched" remains secret. In a first glance, it seems that an adversary (in particular, the server) is able to follow this distinction and conclude which items were touched since the last reshuffling. Furthermore, even if this can be hidden, the server can count the number of touched vs. untouched items and conclude the amount of repeated requests since the last reshuffling. The last drawback is also a result of scanning only the "active" part of the shelter -the size of this part implies the amount of repeated requests.
D Merge Sort Based Solution
Williams and Sion [32] base their solution on the hierarchical solution of Goldreich and Ostrovsky. In order to improve the computational overhead to O(log 2 n), they require a O( √ n) secure client storage, and replace the reshuffling stage with their version of reshuffling, using Oblivious Merge Sort.
Their reshuffling algorithm composed of three stages. First, the real items are copied (re-encrypted) to a temporary buffer at the server storage (the dummy ones are removed). Second, these items are re-located according to a new hash function, using an oblivious merge sort. Third, the items are copied back to their level, with additional dummy items. The first stage is done by scanning the level, reading only the real items to a client local queue, and when it is about half full, the client start to write items from the queue to the buffer (while continuing scanning). The queue size is O( √ n) and the authors prove that with high probability it never overflows. The second stage is based on a similar idea, and is done recursively (recursion depth is O(log n), using client O( √ n)-sized queues). Its correctness depends on the assumption that the items are initially located uniformly (a property of the permutation). At the final stage, a similar idea (to the one in the first stage) is used to copy back to the level the items from the temporary buffer with additional dummies (again, using a client O( √ n) queue).
E Analysis of the Overhead of the Bloom Filter Based Solution
Let us denote the number of items stored in a certain level as m, and the number of hash functions used in the Bloom filter to encode these items as h. Let us also denote the number of bits in the Bloom filter as M .
The value of h is set in Section 4.7 of [33] to be h = 5, and it also required there that error probability of the Bloom filter be 2 −64 . We analyze first the performance based on a setting with h = 5 hash functions, and then analyze performance in a setting with an optimal number of hash functions.
E.1 An Analysis for the Case of h = 5 Hash Functions
Denote the error probability of the filter as 2 −c . The error can be expressed as
Therefore a filter with h hash functions, and with an error probability of 2 −c , must store the following number of bits per item item:
In other words, a level with m items requires a filter with M = h2 c/h m bits. For the parameters of [33] , h = 5, c = 64, this means that the filter must have about M = 35500 · m bits. The process of shuffling a level of m items includes (in Step 5 of [33] ) sorting the Bloom filter by doing O(M log log M ) accesses to the remote storage. In [33] it is assumed that this overhead is essentially O(m) but, in fact, plugging in the previous estimates, it is O(h2 c/h m log log(h2 c/h m)). This is for a level which has m items. Therefore the amortized overhead of this step alone per accessing an item in the storage (which has log n levels, of size 2 i for i = 1, . . . log n) is log n i=1 O(h2 c/h · 2 i · log log(h2 c/h 2 i ))/2 i ≈ O(h2 c/h log log(h2 c/h n) log n).
Assume, as suggested in [33] , that h = 5, c = 64, then Step 5 alone incurs an overhead of 35500 · log n · log(15 + log n) accesses per item request. For n = 2 20 this overhead is about 3.5 · 10 6 . Assuming a lower error parameter of c = 32, and n = 2 20 , the overhead per request is about 40000. Note that these estimates are without taking into account other constants in the "O" notation.
Let us compare the overhead of [33] with the O(log 2 n) overhead of our scheme, while ignoring the constants in the "O" notation (which are rather similar in both cases). The protocol of [33] is better only when h2 c/h log log(h2 c/h n) log n < log 2 n. For the case h = 5, n = 2 20 , this requires that the security parameter satisfies c < 5, namely that the error probability is greater than 1/32, which is clearly unreasonable.
E.2 An Analysis Based on an Optimal Number of Hash Functions
The work in [33] suggests using h = 5 hash functions. It is well known that for given values of m (number of items) and M (size of filter), the optimal number of hash functions is h = 0.7M/m (see, e.g., [11] ). It is also known that in that case, in order to achieve an error probability of at most 2 −c , the size of the filter must be at least M = c · m/ ln 2 ≈ 1.44c · m. Therefore, h = c.
Given these observations, and assuming an allowed error probability of 2 −64 , the number of hash functions, and therefore the number of queries to the Bloom filter at each request and in every level is 64 (which is quite high compared to the two queries to the Cuckoo hashing table in out scheme), and the size of the filter at the last level must be at least 92n bits. The overhead of Step 5 for a level with a Bloom filter of size M is O(M log log M ). It translates to a total overhead of O(M · log n · log log M ) for n queries, where M is the size of the largest Bloom filter used. Since this filter is of size M = 92n, the total amortized overhead per query is O(log n log log n) with a constant of at least 92 in the "O" notation. Had we used an error parameter of 2 −32 , the constant in "O" notation would have been at least 46. These constants are on top of any constants incurred by applying the algorithm several times per level, and in each level. (These constants are similar to those in our solution.) We can therefore conclude that for any reasonable value of n, this O(log n log log n) overhead is worse than the O(log 2 n) overhead of our scheme, since it will hold that 92 log log n > log n).
F Details of the Randomized Shell Sort Algorithm
Shell sort [29] is a sorting algorithm, called after its inventor, Donald Shell. The basic building block of Shell sort, is sorting subsets of the given array, usually using an insertion sort. The subsets are according to a given sequence of offsets {o 1 , o 2 , . . .} such that at the first pass, the subsets are {0, o 1 , 2o 1 , . . .}, {1, 1 +  o 1 , 1 + 2o 1 , . . .}, and so on, at the second pass the subsets are {0, o 2 , 2o 2 , . . .}, {1, 1 + o 2 , 1 + 2o 2 , . . .}, and so on. The last offset must be 1, meaning sorting the whole array. The efficiency of this algorithm depends on the choosing of the sequence of offsets, and is due to the tendency of some sorting algorithms (in particular insertion sort) to be more efficient if the input is "almost sorted". A common sequence of offsets for sorting an array of length n is {n/2, n/4, . . . n/n = 1}. The analysis of the average-case is an open problem and there is no proof that it is O(n logn) (optimal) [28] .
In his recent work, Goodrich [14] suggests a simple, randomized, data-oblivious version of the Shell sort algorithm that always runs in O(n logn) time and sorts any input correctly with very high probability. The innovation in this new approach is that in the inner sorting, it refers to regions and compares randomly selected pairs of elements of the two regions being compared. In order to make the presentation of the andomized Shell sort more clear, we first describe again the traditional Shell sort, in a different way.
Let the sequence of offsets used to sort an array A of length n be {n/2, n/4, . An external observer cannot distinguish between two runs of the Shell sort algorithm (both the original one, and the randomized variant). The basic primitive used is comparing two elements, which can be done obliviously with O(1) secure storage. The advantage of the randomized Shell sort algorithm is its performance. While Goodrich [14] proves that this algorithm runs in O(n log n), the same problem for the traditional Shell sort is still open [28] .
